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Tridas Mukhopadhyay
Graduate School of Industrial Administration
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ABSTRACT
Assessing the economic impacts of alternative Information System (IS) designs and selecting IS design

parameter values for a given decision setting are two important research issues in the domain of
Information Systems. Evaluation studies based on information economics provide rigorous but
restricted models, while traditional MIS studies suggest richer but less formal evaluation frameworks.
In this paper, we attempt to combine the analytical rigor and descriptive richness into a unified and

'

consistent basis for evaluating IS designs and making design modifications (improvements) to existing
IS. Expanding on the concepts of information economics, a multi-dimensional mathematical model of
information quality is developed. Several properties of the quality model with implications for system
design are derived in the form of propositions. The impacts of information quality differential upon the
effectiveness of an operational level decision setting are investigated through a decision-theoretic
approach. Next, a hierarchical model is suggested for relating system design variables to the quality of
information generated by the IS. Based on the quality differential impact analysis and the hierarchical
model, a structured methodology for making design changes to existing IS is outlined.

1.

INTRODUCTION

the quantitative models and the realistic features of the
MIS approach. Expanding on the concept of"information

Two distinct but related issues in the domain of Information Systems (IS) are system design and evaluation. What
are the criteria on which alternative IS designs should be
evaluated? How should the design parameters of an IS be

determined for a given context of use?

structures," we develop a mathematical model of information quality. The economic impacts of the information
quality differential on the decisions utilizing the information are determined. Some properties of the information

These have

quality model with implications for the system designer are

remained two key research questions in the field for many

derived. For example, we show how less detailedl informa-

years. A review of the relevant literature reveals two
categories of research, based on information economics
(Feltham 1968; Hilton 1981; Marschak 1963, 1971; Marschak and Radner 1972; Merkhofer 1977) and traditional
MIS approaches such as the user satisfaction method

tion (which is cheaper to obtain) can lead to the same

payoff for a class of decision problems. Counter-intuitive
results, such as reduced payoffs with increased reporting
frequency, and the conditions under which such problems

are circumvented are obtained. We also provide an
exposition of the design tradeoffs in the choice of informa-

(Bailey and Pearson 1983; Epstein and King 1982; Nolan
and Seward 1974; Zmud 1978). Information economics
provides a rigorous methodology for evaluating "informa-

tion attribute values. Building on the impacts analysis, we
propose a structured methodology for making design
improvements to existing systems. As a typical example

tion structures" in terms of a single criterion called
'fineness" (Marschak and Radner 1972). The MIS literature, although not mathematically as precise as information

of an operational level decision setting, we use a production scheduling scenario as the reference context.

economics, suggests numerous information attributes or

2.

criteria that are not considered by the information economics models. Clearly, there exists a gap between the rigor
of information economics models and the richness of the

MOTIVATION AND PRIOR RESEARCH

Many IS evaluation techniques employ user satisfaction as
a surrogate measure of system effectiveness (Bailey and
Pearson 1983; Ives, Olson and Baroudi 1983; Nolan and
Seward 1974; Powers and Dickson 1973). While this
approach measures the users' satisfaction with an IS,
assessing the economic impacts of the lS is beyond the
scope of this method (Chismar, Kriebel and Melone 1985).

MIS studies.

In this paper, we attempt to develop a unified and theoretically sound basis for the evaluation and design of IS used

in operational level decision making. One of the goals of
this research is to preserve both the analytical precision of

327

In information economics, there has been rigorous research

for this separation of the IS and decision characteristics is

on the "value of information" using an information attribute
called "fineness" (Marschak and Radner 1972). The
"fineness" criterion provides a formal mechanism for
comparing "information structures." An "information
structure" is an abstraction of an IS and may be characterized by a single "likelihood function." However, as
indicated by MIS studies (Adams 1975; Davis 1974; Emery

shown in Figure 1.
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Zmud 1978), an IS requires a multidimensional description,
a feature not considered by the information economics
models.
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Thus, it is evident that in spite of the existence of a body
of literature, there is no generalized analytical model of

Figure 1. A Conceptual Model for IS Design Analysis:

Separation of Signal, System, and

information quality and value. As emphasized by Kriebel
(1979), a consistent mathematical model of information
quality is the first step in the evaluation of an IS. The crux
of the evaluation problem lies in being able to measure the
impact of information quality differential upon the payoff
to the decision maker (DM) utilizing the information. In

Decision Characteristics

The signals generated by an IS have a set of attributes,
which can be defined to be independent of any decision
context, and may therefore be called int,insic attributes.
The design variables are linked to the intrinsic attributes
via an intermediate level of variables, the subsystem
In Section 7, the IS is represented as a
characteristics.
collection of subsystems. Each subsystem has certain
characteristics such as sampling and information updating
time, processing accuracy, etc. (henceforth referred to as
subsystem characteristics), which are determined by the

this paper, one of our goals is to reduce the large informa-

tion attribute set found in the literature into a parsimoniousbut sufficient set of analytically precise definitions.
This precision eliminates redundant attributes, helps derive

propositions with system design implications, and provides
a method for calculating the dollar impacts of information
quality on the DM's decisions. Moreover, the proposed
analysis can be used to make design improvements to
existing systems.

design variables for that subsystem. The intuitive justification for this three-level hierarchy consisting of design
variables, subsystem characteristics, and signal attributes is

In Section 3, we present a conceptual model for the
separation of system and decision characteristics. We
define a sufficient but parsimonious set of signal attributes
in Section 4 and outline a decision-theoretic method for
evaluating the impacts of information quality upon the
DM's payoffs in Section 5. We discuss "subsystem charac-

as follows. Typically, there are a large number of design

variables for an IS. Dealing with these design variables
directly makes design modification a difficult task. The
intermediate level (subsystem characteristics) enables the
designer to perform "dominance analysis" and thereby
identify a small number of "dominant" design variables.
Together with the characteristics of the decision context,
the signal attributes determine the DM's payoff (or cost).
Marschak and Radner (1972) analyzed the impacts of
"fineness" of information structures on a DM's payoff. In
this paper, the analysis is extended to incorporate multiple
dimensions of information quality and their impacts on the
DM's expected payoff.

teristics," design parameters and their general functional
relationships to signal attributes in Section 6. In Section

7, we provide a structured framework for choosing and
setting values of design parameters through "dominance
analysis."

3.

Ex'i,sk

ECUK»M:

1971; Epstein and King 1982; Powers and Dickson 1973;

SEPARATION OF SIGNAL, SYSTEM AND
DECISION CHARACTERISTICS

£1*insic attributes are payoff-relevant (P-R) descriptions

of intrinsic attributes: They indicate whether differences
in signal attributes are relevant for a given decision setting.

Evaluation of IS design involves consideration of two
components: the lS itself and the DM's environment. The

IS designer determines the setting of design variables such

For example, two systems may differ in terms of their

as the number of information processors, storage capacity

accuracy and still yield the same payoff under certain
conditions. Extrinsic attributes are thus measured by the

and number of error detection mechanisms. The choice
of these variables, in turn, determines the attributes of
information (signals) generated by the IS. The impacts of

impact of signal attribute differentials upon a particular
decision context. Intrinsic attributes are stated in technological terms such as time, frequency, and probability of

these attributes on the DM's effectiveness depend on the
characteristics of the decision setting. In order that the
same set of definitions may be applied to any context, the

error, while extrinsic attributes are stated in units of payoff
C e.g., dollars). The designer of the system deals with
intrinsic attributes, while the economic impacts (extrinsic

definitions of design variables and signal attributes must be

attributes) are of interest to the DM.

independent of the decision setting. A conceptual model
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4.

INTRINSIC ATTRIBUTES

The attributes, 'reporting delay," "age of information," and

"currency of information," can be derived from monitoring
In this section, we build on the MIS evaluation literature
and define a mathematically consistent set of intrinsic

signal attributes.

While we do not claim this set to

constitute an exhaustive list, we show that it captures the

essence of a large number of attributes found in the
literature. We propose the following attribute set.
1.

Signal timing

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Reporting frequency
Monitoring time (period)
Signal resolution
Intrinsic accuracy
Intrinsic informativeness

time. "Reporting delay" and "age of information" for any

uncertainty source can be found by subtracting the corresponding monitoring time element from signal timing and
current time respectively. "Currency of information" is
decision context dependent and can be defined as the time
at which the decision is taken minus the monitoring time.

43 Signal Resolution
Definition 3: Let Sl and S2 be the sets of distinct states for
IS 1 and 2 respectively. IS 1 is said to have a higher signal

resolution compared to IS 2, if the following condition is
satisfied:

These attributes are generally not independent of each
other. This non-orthogonality gives rise to interesting
tradeoffs between the attributes, an issue discussed in
Section 7 on design choices.
Before defining the attributes, it is important to provide a

black-box description of an IS. An IS reports on several
sources of uncertainty (e.g., demand, inventory, lead times,
raw material prices). A state of the world may be defined
as a vector of random variables associated with uncertainty
sources and is described by a set of signals, {y}, from the
IS. For every IS there is a set of states, {s} = S, that are
recognized by the IS as being distinct. For example, one
IS may report the exact lead time, while another may only
recognize short and long lead time ranges. Generally, the

For all si €St 3si€S2 such that st C 62

(11)

Intuitively, the condition implies that system 1 reports
greater details either or both in terms of the number of
uncertainty sources and the value ranges. For example, the
IS2 database may contain information on demand and lead

time, a subset of the information content of the ISl
database (demand, lead time and prices), and therefore

have lower resolution. As a second example, system 1 may
recognize every integer value of demand, while system 2
may be sensitive only to low, medium and high ranges of
demand. Resolution also covers aggregation of information (such as monthly versus weekly data, or total demand

versus demand for individual items).

signals are not perfect, being contaminated with "noise."
This noise is expressed in the form of a likelihood function3
A(yls),the probability of receiving ycY, given that s€S has

Resolution does not consider the "noise" present in the
information. For example, the system that reports demand
for individual items is considered to have higher resolution

occurred (see Marschak and Radner 1972).

than the one reporting total demand, even though the
latter may have less "noise" due to a natural averaging

4.1 Signal Timing and Reporting Frequency

effect. For systems that are noiseless with respect to their

state partitions, resolution and "fineness" (as used by
Definition 1: Timing of a signal is the time at which the

Marschak and Radner) have the same meaning:

signal is received by a DM. The reporting frequency, f, is
the inverse of the time interval between the receipt of two
successive signals by a DM.

4.4 Intrinsic Accuracy

While it may seem natural to associate reporting frequency
with repetitive decision making, in Section 6, we show how

Definition 4: For two systems differing only in terms of
their likelihood functions, one is called intrinsically more
accurate than the other only if it is Blackwell sufficient for
the other (Blackwell 1953; Hilton 1981). Let system i have

reporting frequency can be important for a single.decision

setting.

a likelihood function A(yi Is), i = 1,2. {s} = S is the set of

distinct states for the two IS, and {Yi} = Yi is the signal set
of system i. Since S and Y can be continuous or discrete
4.2 Monitoring Time (Period)

Definition 2: Let an IS monitor the states of uncertainty
sources 1, N at times tltN respectively. The set of these

sets, we use the integral sign to denote a generalized
summation operator. Of course, any coarsening of S or Y
is discrete. System 1 is intrinsically more accurate or
Blackwell sufficient for system 2 if a stochastic transforma-

times is called the monitoring time of the IS.

tion g(yi,yi) exists for which the following are satisfied:

If the

monitoring of an uncertainty source, i, takes place from ti
to ti'' then the interval [ti, ti'l is used to denote the monitoring period for i.

A(Yuls) = f

yl€Yi
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g(yl,yDA(yl Is) Vs£ S VY2fY2

(2)

If A(wiil 81) 00 for j 01, then intm·parlition

g<Yl,Yj = 1 Vyi€Yi
Y2£Y2

noise exists

(3)

with respect to {s}.

(4)

more informative than a noiseless system (with lower

Proposition 1: A noisy system with higher resolution is

g(yi,yj < 00 VY2€Y2

resolution) if the noise is only intra-partition type.

Yl EY:

More intuitively, one system is more accurate than the
other if the latter can be realized from the former through
a stochastic transformation. The resolutions of the two
systems must be the same for a comparison of intrinsic
accuracy. For example, it is meaningless to compare the
accuracies of the blind men, each of whom is describing a
different part of the elephant.

Proof: Let {y} be the signal set corresponding to {s} in
the above definition. Using Definition 5, it is seen that a
stochastic transformation from {8} to {s}, given by
g(v/k'yi) = 1 for i=k, and 0 otherwise, satisfies conditions
2,3 and 4.

Discussion: This proposition shows that resolution can be
the sole determinant of informativeness when the noise can

be separated into disjoint components corresponding to the
4.5 Intrinsic Informativeness

partition elements 4, i = 1,2,..,n. It provides a simple tool

for comparing the informativeness of a subset of IS without
The definition of intrinsic informativeness is the same as
that of intrinsic accuracy with the restriction on resolution
removed. Note that uncertainty about the true states of
the world is introduced by differences in accuracy and
resolution. Thus informativeness is the net effect of these
differences. The importance of informativeness is that it
allows us to compare a set of IS (with comparable resolutions) without reference to a decision context. Thus if ISl
is more informative than IS2, then this relationship holds
true for any setting. Therefore, conditions under which
one system is more informative than another are of special

interest to us.

doing the complex sufficiency calculations.
4.7 Mapping between the Proposed and Existing

Attribute Sets
Having defined the signal attributes, we provide a mapping

between these attributes and those mentioned in the
literature. This comparison highlights the confusion that
exists m a section of the evaluation literature due to mixing

of intrinsic and extrinsic attributes and decision characteristics. It is not possible to show a mathematical correspondence between the proposed attributes and those found in

'

Higher resolution does not guarantee higher informativeness. The noise present in the signals may affect informativeness significantly.

the literature because many of the latter ones have not
been defined precisely.

Similarly, low noise alone cannot

ensure high informativeness, since resolution (level of

From the table, we note that several attributes such as
timeliness, relevance, and redundancy, which have been

detail) is the second determinant of informativeness. The
set of special cases where resolution is sufficient for
informativeness is discussed below.

classified as information attributes, are actually decision
context dependent (extrinsic attributes). While intrinsic
attributes can be compared for two lS without reference
to a decision context, it is not meaningful to use extrinsic

4.6 Intra-Partition and Inter-Partition Noise

attributes as dimensions of information quality.

Let {s} and {0} be partitions of a state space S and let {8

have

higher

resolution

than

{s}.

Let

si

=

5.

C e i,e'j, -.,em,} for all i as shown in Figure 2. Let {wii} be
the signal set corresponding to { Gii}·

EXTRINSIC AITRIBUTES: IMPACTS OF
SIGNAL ATYRIBUTES

Two systems may differ in terms of their signal attributes;

1

44

1
le: 1

4

1

L.1

however, the difference in payoff to the DM due to this
attribute differential depends on the decision characteristies. Thus, two systems with different signal timings may
yield the same payoff in certain situations. In that case,
the two systems have the same "timeliness" (to be described as an extrinsic attribute), though the signal attributes are different. This phenomenon is central to the

1

8,
1.1

Figure 1 State Space Partitions with Comparable Resolution

notion of payoff-relevance in that intrinsic attribute
differences may or may not cause a difference in the DM's
Definition 5: If 1(Wk| Blb = 0 for i 0 k and any 1 and j,
then there is no mter-parna-on
noise with respect to {s}.

payoff. When they do not, the attribute differences are not
relevant to the context.
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CURRENT LITERATURE

PROPOSED ATTRIBUTE

Frequency (Davis)
Repetitiveness (Adams)

Reporting frequency

Frequency of use (Gorry and Scott-Morton)
(Gorry and Scott-Morton)

-

Response time (Emery)

Signal timing

Timeliness (Fellham; Hilton)

Extrinsic attribute

Reporting delay
(Epstein and King)

Signal timing -

Currency

Decision time -

(Gorry and Scott-Morton)

Monitoring time

Age (Adams)

Current time Monitoring time

Time horizon (Gorry and Scott-Morton)

Monitoring time

Decision characteristic

Context dependent

Monitoring time
Context dependent

Time covered by the report, e.g., daily demand for a week.

Reporting cycle (Epstein and King)
Scope (Gorry and Scott-Morton)

Resolution

Number of uncertainty sources included; aggregation; range of

Content (Adams; Emery)

values.

Fineness (Marschak and Radner)

Resolution

Aggregation (Gorry and Scott-Morton),
Summarization (Adams)

Resolution

Relevance (Adams),
Selectivity (Emery),

Redundancy (Davis)

COMMENTS

IS is noiseless for the set of distinct states.

Extrinsic attribute

Context dependent

(Action relevant
resolution)

Accuracy (Adams; Emery),

Reliability (Davis; Emery),
Precision (Adams)

Accuracy

Flexibility (Emery; Merkhofer)

Decision characteristic

Cost (Davis; Powers and Dickson)
Value (Davis)

Not a signal attribute

We show that differences in payoff occur due to a reduction of the DM's action set and/or uncertainty differences
regarding the true states of the world. The individual and
joint impacts of intrinsic attributes upon the DM's payoffs
are illustrated below using a production scheduling decision
context. The relevant uncertainty sources for this setting

the MRP-based IS is rarely perfect, the correct amount to

be produced is not known with certainty. Then an outcome may be defined in terms of shortage or excess,
depending on the state and the action chosen. We use a

simple cost function defined as z(a,s) = c+w+ + c-w;
where w+ and w refer to the amount of excess and

are demand, inventory, and shop floor condition (e.g.,
machine loading and operator capacity), one or more of
which may be important for a given setting. For simplicity,
we only consider demand uncertainty in this paper.
Information on these uncertainty sources is generally
provided by an integrated Material Requirements Planning
(MRP) based IS, which contains order processing/fore-

5.1 Payoff Relevant Timing

casting, inventory tracking and scheduling subsystems as
components. The information received from the system

IS signals often get delayed due to various reasons. For

shortage, and c+ and c- to the corresponding unit cost. In

the following subsections, we use the terms "expected
payoff' and "expected cost" interchangeably, with the
understanding that payoff in the current context is the
negative of the expected cost.

may be inaccurate, dated, too aggregate, delayed or

example, long batching delays in a batch-oriented system

irrelevant. We attempt to estimate the dollar impacts of
these information attributes.

are inevitable. In this section, we assess the impact of this
delay on the DM's cost.

Let a be the amount to be produced, an action chosen by
the DM. Let {s} denote the set of demand states. Since

systems be tl and t2· If the DM's action set gets reduced

Definition 6: Let the timings of two otherwise identical
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in the interval [ti,td, such that an action clement which is
optimal for some signal is lost, then the system with timing
4 is considered more timely. The value of timeliness is the
difference in the DM's expected payoff. Thus, if the action
set remains stationary in [tt,td, then the value of timeliness
is zero.

A(t) = i,

demand information system likelihood matrix be X(yi I si),
ACY21 st), A(yi I sD, A(y,I sj = .6, .4, .4, .6 respectively.

choice of numerical variables (e.g., the amount to produce

or order in case of production or order schedules). In
many situations, the maximum value of the variable that

Before t = 4, A(t) does not become binding on the optimal
amounts to produce, and the total minimum cost is $240.
Thus earlier signal timing has no impact before t = 4. But

can be chosen decreases with time. For example, with a
given deadline, the maximum amount that can be produced
reduces with time. Similarly, for raw materials purchase,

for t=5 and 6, the expected cost increases to $245 and
$340 respectively. In fact, it is not worth having the system
(even if for free) with signal timing t > 6, since the DM's

a vendor may fill in orders on a FCFS basis. In that case.

'

orders placed later have a lower chance of getting filled in
a given period. Let A(t) denote the maximum value of the
decision variable that can be chosen at t. Also, let p(s) be

expected cost with a null system is $250.

the prior probability of s.

5.2 Payoff Relevant Accuracy

Proposition 2: With a stationary likelihood function.'
earlier signal timing is preferred if

BA

at

0 if t > 10

Let the DM's cost function be z = 10(a-s)2 and the

An important subset of decision problems involves the

-

30-3t if t < 10

Definition 7: For two systems differing only in terms of
their intrinsic accuracies, the value of payoff relevant (P-R)
accuracy is the difference in expected payoffs (or costs)

given by expression (5) above, with Ak representing the
likelihood function of system k, k = 1,2 and with tl = t2-

< 0.

Proof: The difference in expected costs due to signal
timings ti and ti can be shown to be

From the definition of intrinsic accuracy, it can be noted
that the payoff associated with a more accurate system is
at least as high as that from a less accurate system.

(5)

5.3 Payoff Relevant Reporting Frequency

E (-1)k+1

k=1

yf Y

min

Reporting frequency, f, depends on the type of system in

aE[OACED] · sfs z(a,s),(sly)p(y)

use. An on-line system displays information immediately,
while a batch system reports only periodically. A deferred
on-line system has a reporting frequency in between those
of on-line and batch systems. For a single decision in a
given time frame [O,T] reporting frequency impacts become

where A(sly) = A(yls)p(s) / p(y) and the marginal

probability

S€S

subtle and can be thought of as a combination of accuracy
and timing effects.

A (y Is)p(s)

Since A(ti) > A(t2) for t2 > ti, if a > A(tb for any signal

Say a production decision has to be taken by T. If 1/f <
T, then the DM receives more than one signal (describing

y, then expression (5) is less than zero, showing that the

the state of the same uncertainty sources, though with

expected cost is lower for system 1.

increasing accuracy) in [O,T], assuming that the first signal
is received at t = 0.

Discussion: This proposition provides a way to measure
the usefulness of a system on the basis of its signal timing.

When accuracy increases with time

(due to a reduction in uncertainty over time), the nIh signal

is always more accurate than the n-lth signal for n =
1,2,..,n. However, if the maximum amount that can be

The proposition implicitly indicates the possibility of a
noiseless system becoming inferior to a null system because
of the former's signal timing. A numerical example
involving demand uncertainty follows.

produced, A(t), decreases over time, then the DM has to

determine the optimal trade off between"good" actions and
more accurate information. In particular, after receiving
a signal, the DM has to choose whether it is optimal to

Example: Let there be two demand states st = 10 and

take an action immediately (denoted b a) or to wait for

maximum amount that can be produced be time variant
and be given by

time (i-1)/f is y, let it be denoted by Yi·

s2 = 20 with prior probabilities Pl = P2 = .5. Let the

the next signal (denoted by B). If the P signal received at

The DM's

expected cost with a reporting frequency f is given by:

332

f

min

Cip(y) where f 1

(6)

6 6 [ot,B]

Example:
two otherwise
forecasting
IS 1 and 2Let
report
demand atidentical
intervalsdemand
of 3 and
4 weeks
respectively. If the signal accuracy increases with time, the

Yl€Y

likelihood matrix of each IS gradually approaches an
identity matrix. For illustration, let the time variation be
min

given by At(yl I st) = At(Y21 SD = 1 -.4e-": Let A(t) be given
by 36-t2 if t < 6, and 0 otherwise. Let the cost function

= a€[OA(0)1 SES z(a,s),(slyi) if 6 =01

be z = 10(a-sjz.

- f

min

With system 1, the DM is forced to take an action at t = 3,

Ca|p(Y2 | Yl) if 6 =B

42 may similarly be defined terms of (3•

because the next signal is at t=6 with A(6) = 0. With
system 2 (which has lower reporting frequency), the DM
takes an action after receiving the second signal at t = 4,
and this results in the lowest expected cost.

Proposition 3: For two otherwise identical systems 1 and
2 with reporting frequencies f, and fz respectively, fi > G

5.4 Payoff Relevant Monitoring Time

6 E [c,Bl
Y2€Y

does not guarantee lower expected cost with system 1.
Proof: By construction. Say fi and G are such that three
signals (at t= 0, 1/fi, and 2/fi) from system 1 and two

Very often a DM may need to know the value of a random
variable (e.g., demand) at a particular time in order to
make a decision. For example, a DM using a simple
forecasting routine needs to know the demand, inventory

signals (at t -0, 1/fj from system 2 are received by the

DM in the interval [O,T]. Since the accuracy increases with

and shop floor conditions fur day t in order to make a

time, signal 2 (from system 11) <a signal 2 (from system 2)

production decision for day t + 1. In this case, t is the P-R

<, signal 3 (from system 1), where <, stands for "less

monitoring time.

If the IS monitors the value of the

accurate than." Let Yi· denote the ith signal from system i,

random variables at any other point in time, then the

i = 1,2. The first signaJ is denoted by yi for both systems.

corresponding signal becomes less valuable, even though

Say A(t) and the likelihood function are such that for all
Yi, 6 =B, and that

it may be perfect for the state of the world at the sampling
instant. In general, the larger the difference between the

P-R and actual monitoring times, the less the P-R relevance of the signal. In fact, when the difference is sufficiently high, the signal has no releyance to the state of the

m in

world at the required time. Let s denote state s at time

722£YaE[OA(1/fjl sfs z(a,s)A(sly22)p(y22 lyl) <

f

t. If the monitoring time is 0 and the P-R time is t, then
the expected cost is given by

(7)

min

min r

y12£ yac [OA(1/ft)] · sf
s z(a,S)A(s 1 2)PC 2|Yl) <

fy,yac[O,Al Jsoes

f

r
s,ES Z(a,s )p(s 199 A(sgy)p(y)

min

y13f ya€[O,AG/fi)1

sfs z(a,s)A(s | )P( 3 lyl)
where p(st I soj) is the probability of state si occurring at t,

given that state sj occurred at 0.

The above condition implies that for all signals at 0, the
DM waits for a later signal, and that the expected cost of

Proposition 4: Let the functional form for the conditional

taking an action at t = 1/4 is lower than those of taking

actions at either 1/4 or 2/fi.

probability p(s i I s°j) be given by

Discussion: This proposition shows that an increase in
reporting frequency can lead to an increase in expected
cost if the action set is time variant. The design implica-

= e" + (1 - em) p(sti) if i= j

= p(si,)[1 - e*,] otherwise.

tion that emerges as a corollary is that the reporting
frequency should always be increased by an integer
multiple of the original frequency. Otherwise, arbitrary

For sufficiently large L the system approaches a null

increases in frequency (as used in the proof above) can
lead to higher costs. A numerical example follows.

system. The rate of approach increases with a.
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Proof: Let p(s') be the DM's prior probability density on

The expected cost is given by

{s} at t. Then as t -+ CO, p(sti I S j) -+ p(s i)

Therefore, VaV € > 0 3t such that I p(s'i) - p(sti 1 soj) 1 <

f

v i and j. Thus, for sufficiently small c, Le., for suffi-

yey a€[OA] Js ES z(a,sp)A(sply)p(y)

ciently large t, expression (7) tends to

min

Example: A numerical example involving aggregation of
information may be useful. Consider the demand for two

fy,ya,[0.Als'£Sfs'¢ S z(a,s.5p(4ACS'ly)p(y)
I l l

min Jf

ac[O,A]

s'€S

items 1 and 2 denoted by random variables xi and Xe

t
t
z(a,s )p(s )

respectively. Let xi, X2 £ { 100,200}. Let the cost function
be given by z(at,22791,© = 4(a -X ) + 6(82-XD: Thus, there

are four P-R states. LEt an (xi,© = (100,100), (100,200),
(200, 100), (200,200). Let an order processing system
aggregate the information by reporting the total demand.

which is simply the expected cost for a null system. With
larger values of a and for a given value of £, t becomes
smaller and the system approaches the null system faster.
Discussion:

rnYn f

The set of distinct states of this IS is given by {0} = {200,

300,400}. Let the prior density on the states be uniform.
Also, let the system be noiseless with respect to {8}. With
the system, the expected cost is found to be $12,500 with
a'l = a'z = 150. This is the (opportunity) cost of lowerthan-adequate resolution, since the cost with a perfect
system and just-adequate resolution is $0 in this example.

The functional form of the conditional

probability is fairly general in that, as t increases, the
information on the state at time 0 becomes progressively
irrelevant in predicting the state at t. a is a measure of the

rate at which the relevance of the signal is lost.

For

example, if the demand for a product is highly variable,
then the corresponding a has a small value, indicating that

Cost of Higher-Than-Adequate Resolution

the relevance of the information is lost quickly. This
proposition indicates that it is desirable that the actual
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monitoring time be close to the P-R time. Unfortunately,
this may not always be feasible when long information
processing times and time variant action sets are involved.
In those cases, the monitoring may have to be done earlier
to avoid a loss of timeliness of the signal. This concept is

If e has higher resolution than Sp then some additional
effort is required upon the receipt of a signal in order to
find the corresponding state in the P-R set Sp. In this case,
the difference in cost is equal to the difference in the cost

of additional information processing.

further discussed with an example in Section 7 on design
modifications.
5.53

5.5 Resolution Adequacy

Action Relevant Resolution

Definition 8: Let Sp denote the payoff-relevant set,of the

For a wide variety of decision problems, the level of detail
required is coarser than the corresponding P-R levels. For
example, consider a production system with two batch

states for a DM. Let e be the set of states considered as

sizes: 50 and 80 units. Say demand can take four values,

distinct by an IS. The resolution of the IS is just adequate
if 8 = Sp, lower or higher than adequate accordingly as e

30, 50, 80 and 100 units. The P-R partition of the demand
space has four corresponding elements. However, note

has lower or higher resolution than Sp.

that the restricted optimal batch sizes are 50 units for any
one of the states 30 and 50 and 80 units for the states 80
and 100 (assuming that the unit shortage cost is equal to
the unit excess cost). Therefore, for this restricted action
set, an IS that cannot distinguish between the states 30 and
50, and between 80 and 100 results in the same expected
cost as the one providing the P-R partition. We refer to
the less detailed IS as having the action-relevant (A-R)
resolution. This exposition is both interesting and important because it shows the possibility of getting the same

5.5.1

Cost of Lower-Than-Adequate Resolution

Let {8} = e have lower resolution than the P-R set {sp}.
To determine the impacts of this resolution on the DM's
payoff, we calculate the conditional probability A (sply)
from A(@Iy), as

payoff (or cost) with less detailed information for a class
of decision problems.

,(sply) = 0Ijp(sple),(ely) where
p(spi 8) = p(# Isp)p(sp) / f

Definition 9: Let {ss} = Ss be the state space partition of
an IS. This IS is said to have action relevant resolution, if,
for every s., only one action is optimal for every state that

pce Isp)p(sp) and
Sp €Sp

may be contained in s,.

Vsp£Sp 38 £8 such that p(G Isp) = 1.
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Proposition 5: Consider two IS, one with the A-R resolution and the other with higher resolution. Let the systems
be noiseless with respect to their own state partitions. The
expected payoff (or cost) difference between the two IS is

Next we turn to the subsystem level of the IS and study the
design tradeoffs involved.

zero.
6.
Proof: Referring to Figure 2, consider {s} and {8 } as
partitions with A-R and higher resolution respectively. Let
z(a,G) be the cost function. Since the IS are noiseless with
respect to their set of distinct states, the expected cost with
a system that provides partition {9}i s given by

I

,

identified in every IS. For example, a simple database
management system consists of storing, processing and
retrieving subsystems.

I

*4,82)P(,D + ···-

The monitoring subsystem samples states of the world.
For example, machine loading, operator capacity and

2€52

1€St

where a, is the optimal action corresponding to si. With
the A-R resolution, the expected cost is

I

s,€S

min

a€A

Conceptually, an IS may be represented as a collection of

tion handling activities, one or more of which can be

min z(a,#)p(8)

zcal,81)p(81) +

6.1 Subsystem Characteristics

the following subsystems: monitoring storing, processing
(transformation), retrieving and transmitting subsystems
(see Marschak 1971). These are the fundamental informa-

Bfe a [0441

I

INSIDE THE IS BLACK BOX

maintenance routines may be monitored by the scheduling
subsystem of the MRP-based lS. The processing subsystem processes the monitoring data to create new information (e.g., the generation of parts list from customer order
information) and/or transforms the monitoring data into
aggregate reports. The parts requirement subsystem of the

y

8, s,z(a,ei)p(Oil©p(si)

integrated MRP system is an example of the processing

subsystem. It takes as input order and forecasting information and generates (through processing) raw material

Note that p(#ilsi)p(si) is equal to p(s, 1 #i)p(Bi) and that

p(4 #i) = 1 for all Gicsi.
costs above are equal.

Therefore, the two expected

requirements. The exact sequence of subsystems is not the

same for every IS.

Discussion: Once the A-R level of detail is reached, more

Each subsystem may be considered as an individual system

details are of no consequence to the decision context.

and described by certain attributes which are referred to
as subsystem characteristics. For example, like the entire

Therefore, any additional information is undesirable
because of the extra cost of more detailed information and

IS itself, the monitoring subsystem has accuracy, frequency,

the processing load placed on the DM.

resolution, etc., as its attributes. These attributes are in
turn determined by the design variables of the monitor.

Proposition 6: For systems that are noiseless with respect

to their own state partitions, A-R partition is "weakly
coarser" (i.c., never finer) than P-R partition.

The general relationships between subsystem characteristics and signal attributes are discussed in the balance of
this section.

Proof: Suppose not. Assuming that A-R partition is finer
than the P-R partition, let { # } and {si} (in Proposition 5)
be the A-R and P-R partitions respectively. Without loss
of generality, assume that the A-R element {si} consists of

The accuracy of each subsystem may be represented by a

optimal actions for the states 01, and 82 respectively. From

the input set of distinct states fur subsystem i,i = 1,2,...,n.

likelihood function relating the inputs and outputs of the

two P-R elements, 81, and 81. Let a* and a** be the - subsystem. For a serial architecture, let {s,} = Si denote

Note that {s,} is also the output set of stage i-1 for

P-R considerations, we have z(a*,8 <j = z(a*,81) and

From A-R considerations, z(a*,eli)

<

i = 2,3,...,n.

Let A(4+1 J sl) denote the probability of the

output state being sii+E, given that si is the input. If a
subsystem is noiseless and does not induce a change in

z(a**,eli) and

z(a**,822) < z(a*,82). This leads to a contradiction.

resolution, then A(. 1.) denotes an identity transformation.
For example, an ideal transmission subsystem should have

Discussion: Since more detailed information is generally
more costly, Proposition 6 indicates that for a class of
decision problems, the A-R resolution is less detailed than
the P-R resolution and is therefore cheaper to obtain.
Propositions 5 and 6 provide direct guidelines for selecting

this property.
The signals of the IS are generated by the last subsystem,

n.

Combining the transitional probabilities for each

subsystem, the conditional probability of the signal being
y, given that the input of subsystem 1 is sl, is obtained as

the information content in IS design.
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A(Y IsO = f
S2€S2

7.

A(ylsn)A(s»]sn-))...ACS21si)

...

Sn€ S.

ANALYSIS"

What should be the IS design variable values, given a
particular decision setting? Consider an existing IS with
certain signal attributes. Is the current design optimal? If
not, how should the design parameters (such as processing
capacity and number of error detection mechanisms, etc.)
be modified? We use a structured technique (we call it
"dominance analysis") to address this problem. The basic
principle is to narrow down the design parameter space by
successively eliminating signal attributes, subsystem
characteristics and design variables that do not cause a

However, the DM is generally interested in the output set

Sk of the processing subsystem, k.

SETTING DESIGN VARIABLES: "DOMINANCE

Therefore, the

relevant likelihood function is X(4+ 1 | y), and is given by

. sif
st A(4+list)[A(ylst)p(st) / si<sl A(ylsi)p(si)]

substantial improvement in payoff.
For example, st may denote demand for each item, while
Sk+1 may denote total demand for a subset of items. Thus,
the accuracies of the individual subsystems can be related
to the overall likelihood function for the IS.

some risk of suboptimization in this approach, but the
tradeoffs between computational simplicity and efficiency

become evident. Several variations of "dominance analysis"
are possible. One such technique is outlined below.

The signal resolution of the IS is bounded by the subsystem with the lowest resolution. For example, the moni.
toring subsystem may be sensitive to demand of each item

1,

on each day, while the processing subsystem may aggregate
this information into weekly demand data for a group of

We start from the DM's side, since starting with the
large number of IS design variables makes the analysis
difficult. Consider the intrinsic attributes one at a time

items.

and examine their effects on the DM's payoff as
outlined in Section 5. If the payoff remains constant
(e.g., this can happen with signal timing if the action
set is time invariant over the time period of interest)
or decreases (e.g., this can occur if the current signal
resolution is the same as that of the A-R set of states)
with changes of an attribute value, then eliminate it.
If the effect on payoff is "insignificant" for one or more
attributes, then eliminate the same.

The timing of a signal from the IS is determined by the
activity durations of the individual subsystems and queueing
times between activities. The signal reporting frequency
depends on the activity and queueing times and also on the

frequency of the monitoring subsystem.

The three level

hierarchy allows us to deal with a few variables at a time,
as we move to lower levels of increasing details. There is

The signal

monitoring time is determined by the sampling time of the
monitor.

2.

Turn to the subsystem level.

Vary the subsystem

characteristics one at a time and note their effects on

6.2 Relating Design Variables to Subsystem

the signal attributes (as outlined in Section 6) that
were not eliminated in step 1. The aim here is to

Characteristics

identify"bottlenecks" at the subsystem level.6 If certain

subsystem characteristics are found to be insensitive in

Since the subsystems are relatively independent of one
another in terms of their subsystem characteristics, the
problem of relating design variables to signal attributes
reduces to finding relationships between characteristics of
each subsystem and its design variables. It is not possible
to have one universal model for relating design variables
and subsystem characteristics in any IS. Rather, the
models have to be chosen depending on the IS type. For
example, queueing models may be used to relate design

terms of their effects upon the signal attributes, they

are eliminated.
3.

For each subsystem characteristic not eliminated in

step 2, identify the corresponding design variables. As
in step 2, vary the design variables one at a time and
eliminate the "insensitive" ones. Sometimes a change

in a design variable may necessitate a change in some
other design variable(s) for technological reasons. For

variables such as the number of processors, batch size and

permissible queue length to the average waiting time in the

example, an increase in the number of order processors in an integrated production control system may
have to be accompanied by an increase in the number

order processing subsystem of the MRP-based IS, while
regression may be appropriate in relating the number of
error detection mechanisms to the frequency of missing
information in the transmission subsystem. Economic

of terminals for entering order information. In this
case, the two design variables have to be considered
in tandem in the analysis of the existing system. Also,

production theory may also be useful in establishing
linkages between design variables and subsystem characteristics (see Kriebel and Raviv 1980). Next, we discuss a

a change in a design variable may affect several signal
attributes. For example, increasing the number of
error detection stages changes both accuracy and

structured technique for setting the design variables of an

IS.
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signal timing. At the end of this step, we have a small

set of "sensitive" design variables.

4.

Let V = {v} be the set of sensitive variables found in
step 3. Let the signal attributes be denoted by SA =
Let the DM's payoff function be P =
{sa}.
P(sat,saf,···)· The functional form of P has been
discussed in detail in Section 5. Since {v} is the set of
sensitive design variables, we can also write P as
P(Vi,VD-4 through a mapping between {sa} and {v}.
With the sensitive design variables and their impacts
on payoff identified, we turn next to the cost side of
the analysis, assuming that the payoff and cost are

separable.
5.

time t, Thus, the sampling time of the monitoring subsys-

tem (which is a design variable for the monitor) is t. In
this case, t is also the monitoring time, defined earlier as
a signal attribute: Let p be the processing time necessary

to generate an updated production schedule from the
monitoring data. Thus the revised production schedule is
available at time t + p. Say a DM uses this information to

decide on the amount of raw materials to order. Let the
maximum amount that can be ordered be time variant and

be denoted by

a < O.
A(t), at
Let T be the P-R monitoring time. If the actual sampling
time t 0 T, then t should be changed. However, note that

Generally, the cost of implementing and operating the

system with new design variable values is not known
in advance. What is known with certainty is the cost
at the current operating point v( = (vi ,vk'".), where
the subscript c refers to the current levels. Instead of
assuming a known cost function for the entire design
space, we only assume that the partial cost derivatives

(with respect to the sensitive design variables) are
known at vc. With this knowledge, a second order
Taylor series expansion gives the approximate cost
C(va) at a new operating point vn = (vin,vzv -) in the

changing t affects the signal timing in addition to the
monitoring time itself. This is an example of a change in

a single design variable causing a change in multiple signal
attributes. If t < T, then increasing t improves the payoff
on one hand due to increased signal "relevance" and on the
other hand possibly reduces the payoff due to the delayed

signal timing (which affects the amount that can be
ordered). Without considering the cost side, the optimal
choice of sampling time is given by

neighborhood of v . More formally, let Avi = Vin - Vic
denote the change in the variable v,.

min r f
t

Let the operator

min

i.ly,y aE[OA(t+p)1 . s,fs· s,Es
z(a,s'DP(Sfi 14)1(4 ly)p(Y)]

such that

where t affects the action set [OA(t + p)] and the relevance
of the signal as encoded in p(s'; ls,J).

Another example of a design modification leading to a

fc = E Av1 av
an.

change in multiple signal attributes is the tradeoff between

accuracy and signal timing. When uncertainty reduces over
time, earlier signals are less accurate than later ones. Thus

The approximate cost at vn is given by C(vn) = C(\0
+ f C(Vc) +

42C(Vc)· The new operating point can be

on one hand, the expected cost decreases with later signals
due to the increase in accuracy, while on the other, it can
increase due to a possible reduction in the action set. The

chosen by considering the region in the design space
where the increase in payoff starts to saturate and the
cost of the corresponding design change begins to rise
sharply.

relevant design issue is to synchronize the system to
generate a signal at a time such that the DM's cost is
minimized. The choice of signal timing with time varying

likelihood function and action set is given by

The above procedure simplifies the design modification
process by eliminating relatively insensitive attributes,

subsystem characteristics and design variables before

.

analyzing the payoff related tradeoffs (steps 4 and 5). It

r

min [J

thus helps narrow down the search space and increases the

t

min

ycy aE[OA(t)]

f

·|scs

z(a,s)At(s ly)pE(y)]

accuracy of the payoff and cost estimates. At the same
time, however, optimality of the solution cannot be ensured
due to the fact that the intrinsic attributes and subsystem
characteristics are considered one at a time.

8.

CONCLUSIONS

This paper has attempted to provide a consistent, theory-

based analytical framework for the evaluation of alterna-

The following examples show how a change in a design
variable may affect multiple signal attributes. Say the
loading of machines on the shop floor are sampled at

tive IS designs and modification of existing system designs
to better match the characteristics of the decision setting.
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In the process, a mathematical model of information
quality has been developed. Certain properties of this
quality model with direct implications for system design
have been derived. The proposed model captures in a
rigorous manner the essence of numerous dimensions of
information value found in the MIS evaluation literature.
A decision-theoretic method for measuring the impact of
information quality differential upon the DM's payoffs has

been illustrated. A three-level hierarchy consisting of
signal attributes, . subsystem characteristics and design
variables has been defined and a cost-benefit framework
for design modifications has been established through a
structured technique called dominance analysis.

An interesting application of the proposed framework
would be the measurement of the impact of alternative
system designs upon decisions in the domain of production
management. Information acts as an input to controlrelated decisions at various stages of any production
system. The quality of information affects decision
outcomes in various ways, ranging from excess raw
materials purchase through production backlog to wrong
shipments. For this purpose, the MRP-based IS of a real-
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4.

Marschak and Radner assume that the information
structures are noiseless with respect to their set of
distinct states.

5.

The subsystem characteristics are intrinsic properties

10. ENDNOTES

1.

2.

More precisely, less detailed than Marschak's (1963)
payoff relevant description of states.

of the subsystems. For example, the accuracy of the
processing subsystem is independent of the accuracy

The concept of payoff relevance was introduced by

of the transmitting subsystem, although they may
handle the same data set.

Marschak (1963). Roughly speaking, it refers to the
level of detail in the information that is sensitive to the
DM's payoff. In this paper, we generalize the concept

to include all attributes of information.
3.

6.

For example, oIl but one subsystems may be noiseless
and still the noisy subsystem may introduce significant
noise in the signals.

7.

For this simple case, the intermediate level of subsystem characteristics is not necessary.

For clarity, suppose we are sampling independent
observationsyl'.., yN, from a population whose probability functionf(y; B) involves one parameter, B. The
joint probability function of the sample observations
("signals") is
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